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The Decline of U.S. Manufacturing: Issues of Measurement1 
Elizabeth L. Rose 
University of Leeds, UK and Indian Institute of Management Udaipur, India 
 
Challenges associated with the measurement of complex phenomena pervade social science 
research. That said, some phenomena seem as though they should be reasonably 
straightforward to measure, especially given the availability of apparently reliable, 
government-provided data.  
 The state of the U.S. manufacturing sector would seem to fall into this category. The 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which has a mandate to provide “gold-standard data” 
that are “accurate, objective, relevant, timely, and accessible” (www.bls.gov), provides 
extensive data that can be used to gain insights into various aspects of U.S. economic activity. 
Data are readily available, for example, to facilitate delving into historical issues of 
productivity and employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector. 
 As shown in Figure 1 of Contractor (2021, in this issue), prior to the current pandemic, 
U.S. manufacturing output was nearly as high as it has ever been. On the other hand, Figure 2 
of the same commentary tells a different story about employment. In December 2019, 
employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector was estimated at 12,866,0002; this is 
approximately the same level as December 1941 (12,876,000), when the U.S. population was 
about 40% of its current size. There has been a precipitous drop since the start of the 21st 
century. The loss of approximately 4.4 million manufacturing jobs (17,284,000 in January 2000 
to 12,866,000 in December 2019) represents more people than the population of any U.S. city 
 
1 This commentary draws heavily on the work of Susan N. Houseman, especially Houseman (2018). I am deeply 
grateful to Arie Lewin for his encouragement and his insightful comments on earlier versions of this work. 




other than New York; a further 613,000 manufacturing jobs had been lost as of November 
2020. These job losses have affected a wide swathe of industries, in contrast to the more 
industry-specific (e.g., steel, automotive assembly) job losses of the 1980s, and have occurred 
simultaneously with an increase in the working-age population in the U.S. (unlike, e.g., Japan, 
where lower manufacturing-sector employment has been coincident with a shrinking labor 
force). 
 This fall in manufacturing-sector employment is fully consistent with the U.S. 
economy’s well-documented shift toward services. However, it has substantial implications for 
the standard of living, especially for lower-skilled employees. For generations of U.S. workers, 
manufacturing jobs provided the basis for the expectation that each generation would be better 
off than the last. This had much to do with attractive wage rates for work that was difficult but 
that did not require higher education or deep technical expertise. Working in U.S. automotive 
assembly plants or steel mills, for example, was demanding, but offered financial security for 
employees and their families. Arguably more important, and quite specific to the U.S., were 
the non-wage benefits, typified by the comprehensive health insurance and pension benefits 
that have long been available to employees in U.S. auto assembly plants. Often-adversarial 
relationships between the companies and trade unions contributed a great deal to what became 
intergenerational upward mobility. Many of these jobs are now gone. 
 What explains the decades-long decline in employment in the U.S. manufacturing 
sector? Contractor (2021) raises several potential causal mechanisms: globalization and the 
offshoring of manufacturing jobs, increases in productivity that have been enabled by 
automation and other technological advances (e.g., information and communications 
technology), and a power shift between industrial labor unions and companies. It seems clear 
that all have contributed, but there is little agreement regarding their relative importance. Many 




and commentators attribute manufacturing job losses to globalization and offshoring, with a 
particular emphasis on China. In a notable turnaround from his earlier work, Krugman (2018) 
highlights the impact – unforeseen in the 1990s – that China’s swift development into an 
export-focused market economy and a manufacturing powerhouse has had on employment in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector. 
However, the complexity of any national economy – especially one as embedded in the 
global economy as the U.S. – makes causal inferences regarding individual mechanisms 
extremely difficult to justify. One major issue is associated with the data that are used to 
understand complex and nuanced phenomena. Averages mask a great deal of important detail, 
and nationally aggregated macroeconomic data hide nuances associated with categories such 
as industry and location. For example, job losses in one state that are offset by increases in 
another create no change in national data. However, there is often a “stickiness” associated 
with home states. During the severe downturn in the U.S. automotive industry of the 1980s, 
surprisingly large numbers of former automotive assembly workers chose to remain in the “rust 
belt”, rather than relocating to distant states to seek employment in other industries (e.g., the 
then-expanding oil industry in Texas), despite limited job options at home. In addition to family 
ties and psychic distance3, such downturns in dominant local industries often depress the real 
estate market, saddling workers with unsellable houses and effectively anchoring them in place. 
National data hide much of the story.  
Assumptions also matter. Discussing the particularly severe impact on lower-skilled U.S. 
workers, resulting from the unforeseen interaction of hyper-globalization and the rapid increase 
in the participation of developing economies – especially China – in global manufacturing and 
trade, Krugman (2018: 9) notes,  
 
3 While we generally think of psychic distance as pertaining to different nations, states and regions in the U.S. 




The 90s consensus, however, focused almost entirely on Heckscher-Ohlin-type 
analysis, asking how the growth of trade had affected the incomes of broad labor 
classes, as opposed to workers in particular industries and communities. This was, 
I now believe, a major mistake – one in which I shared. 
Stratifying data by location is relatively straightforward. Teasing out industry effects can 
be much more complicated. Houseman (2018: 2) provides compelling arguments with respect 
to the importance of considering industry-level data for understanding the state of U.S. 
manufacturing, noting that what appears to be strong growth in aggregate productivity is 
“driven by a relatively small sector – computers and electronic products, which account for 
only about 13 percent of value-added in manufacturing”. In addition to driving the aggregate 
data, this industry represents an outlier in other key dimensions, making it extremely 
influential. For example, while real output in the manufacturing sector, apart from the computer 
industry, increased by approximately 45% during 1977-2016, the corresponding figure for the 
computer industry itself was 19,257% (Houseman, 2018: 11). This period has also seen much 
of the production in the computer industry shift from the U.S. to Asia. Confounding matters 
even further is the fact that productivity in the computer sector is treated rather specifically in 
U.S. government statistics, and is more reflective of developments in computing strength than 
of automation in production processes; see Houseman, Bartik, & Sturgeon (2015) for more 
detail. 
Houseman (2018) demonstrates the huge impact that the computer industry has on U.S. 
aggregate statistics pertaining to both output and productivity, and how this distorts the 
interpretation of seemingly clear data. The danger of excessive aggregation comes into sharp 
focus when considering manufacturing employment growth rates. Table 1 provides a stark 












Difference in employment growth rates 2.5% 2.6% 
Proportion attributable to GDP growth 14.7% 60.9% 
Proportion attributable to labor productivity growth 85.3% 39.1% 
Adapted from Houseman (2018:39) 
 
While the overall difference in employment growth rates do not change much, whether or not 
the computer industry is included, the apparent explanatory mechanisms are very different. For 
the more aggregated data, the driver appears to be labor productivity growth. However, when 
the computer industry is excluded, the driver is GDP growth. Considering 2007-2016, 
separating out the computer industry reveals that the approximately 1.9% difference in 
employment growth rates is completely attributable to GDP growth. The upshot of the 
combination of measurement-related anomalies and excessive aggregation of the data is that 
“there is no prima facie evidence that productivity growth is entirely or primarily responsible 
for the relative or absolute decline in manufacturing employment” (Houseman, 2018: 14).  
To complicate matters even further, measures of labor productivity growth are driven by 
more than solely automation. Outsourcing – both foreign and domestic – provides a clear 
example. Labor productivity measures improve when outsourced labor costs are lower than the 
comparable in-house labor costs. This is generally the intention associated with outsourcing, 
and is important, especially as labor-intensive activities are arguably more likely to be subject 
to offshoring to countries that offer lower labor costs. The fine-slicing of global value chains 
(e.g., Buckley and Strange, 2015) – while very understandable from a business perspective – 
is thus not well-captured in U.S. national-level productivity statistics (Houseman, 2018), which 
means that straightforward explanations for the forces that are driving the decline in 




It seems difficult to completely dismiss the idea that trade has played a role in the steep 
drop in employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector, especially in light of the sharp rise in 
imports from China since its accession to the WTO in 2001. Krugman (2018:8) notes that the 
rapid change in the U.S. trade deficit “explains more than half of the roughly 20 percent decline 
in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005”. Whether the imports are the output of 
foreign firms or of U.S. firms that have offshored their production is important to U.S.-based 
multinationals, but probably matters very little to U.S. workers whose manufacturing jobs have 
disappeared. Former automotive and steel production employees probably do not care much 
about the nuances of what has created fundamental shifts in the U.S. and other western 
economies, but we academics should – and do – care about such details. This necessitates a 
very deep understanding of the available data, which has characteristics that are far from 
obvious. We also need to bear in mind that aggregate data mask great deal of specific 
information, some of which is necessary to develop deeper insights, and that causal attributions 
are extremely difficult in a complex system.  
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